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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE
Mr. JAVITS. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I appreciate the
comments which the d1stlngu.1shed Senator from New York has just made. I
am sorry I have not been able to follow
the full content of his speech, becauseas always-! know he makes a distinct
contribution.
But I would say that while Communist
Chlna is a menacing shadow over all of
southeast Asia--and perhaps we could
say over south Asia, as well. in view of
the aggressive tactics of Communist
China some months ago against Indiait is my belief that so far as HanoiNorth Vietnam-is concerned, based on
the ancient enmity of the Vietnamese
people toward China, the relationship
between Hanoi and the Soviet Union may
well be closer and may prove to be a
mitigating factor.
I would point out that so far as General de Gaulle is concerned, to the best
of my knowledge he did not Indicate that
Communist China should be brought into consideration in connection with all of
old Indochina, but that his remarks diverged in two directions. One was recognition of Peiping, which I think was a
tragic mistake, as I said yesterday; and
in that respect I join in the remarks
made by the Senator from Minnesota
[Mr. HUMPHREY], the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Doool, the Senator from
Ohio [Mr. LAuscHE], and others in deploring that act. Aside from what the
French did on their own responsibility in
that respect, and in connection with a
government which is acting within those
bounds, I was sorry to note that the Government of Formosa broke relations with
General de Gaulle, although I understand that, in effect, that was forced by
Paris, in an attempt to get away from
continued French recognition of Formosa and to make possible French recognition of Peiping. That is an unfortunate
situation; and I think the Nationalists
by their action took President de Gaulle
out of a hole in which he had inadvertently placed himself.
So far as the other divergent viewIndochina-is concerned, I think General de Gaulle, who is a man of great historic perspective, and quite often offers
ideas which at least are worth consideration-whether they prove to be nght or
wrong, only time will tell, is aware of a
deepening difficulty in that area; and
certainly France, based on 80 years of experience in Laos, Cambodia, and the two
Vietnams, is in a position to speak with
some degree of authority.
It is true that the United States has
15,500 troops there at the present time, as
"advisers." We are faced with a number
of choices. We can go ahead and can
increase our military commitment and
can increase our resource expenditures
and can carry the war to North Vietnam, and maybe Into Communist China,
itself, and be prepared to pay the consequences. I do not think that Is the
motive behind American thinking
I
hope it is not.
Or we can withdraw. I think that
would be just as bad a mistake, because
then South Vietnam and the rest of
southeast Asia would be placed at the
mercy of elements connected with the
Communist movement.
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There may be a third alternative, and
it may be the suggestion advanced by De
Gaulle--which may be a good one or may
be a bad one; at the moment, no one can
tell. But it any stability 1s to be brought
to South VIetnam, It 1.s not going to be
done on the basis of coup after coup after
coup.
Personally, I deplore what happened
to the late President Ngo Diem Dinh,
who, in spite of all his faults, I thought
was a good man, and who did maintain
a degree of civilian control over that government. If he had his way, I think he
might In time have achieved a degree of
stabll1ty which would have redounded to
the benefit of his country.
But if we go back to the Geneva Agreement of 1954, to which we were not signatories, we recall that that agreement
partitioned Vietnam at the 17th parallel, and also contained a provision that
within 2 years thereafter there would be
elections, in both North Vietnam and
and South Vietnam, as to what the future of the country would be.
I do not endorse the election proposal
in that Geneva Agreement; but, after all,
we did agree--at least, by associationto a line of demarcation of the 17th
parallel.
I belleve that the stability of South
Vietnam must be maintained; and if, for
example, there Is some way, based on De
Gaulle's suggestion, and apart from any
consideration of Peiping and recognition
of Communist China, that this stab1l!ty
could be given a chance to enhance itself, and if Vietnam could become a more
stable nation, then I think the idea, if not
the proposal, is at least worth considering.
I repeat that it may be a good idea; it
may be a bad idea; it may have some
value; it may be worthless. But we have
to have something to contrast with the
choice between going all the way in or
all the way out; and one of the ideas advanced in that area is such a factor as
an international patrol which would
guarantee a true neutrality and a true
territorial integrity which would stop the
ftow of arms along the Ho Chi Minh
traii-{)r by sea, which is the way they
seem to be coming in at the present
time--that stability perhaps to be maintained by American troops who are
there, and or perhaps by others of international agencies, so that there would
be a type of neutrality based on guarantees-not on words, proposals, or
promises.
So I think these statements should be
made--even though they have taken a
little longer than I anticipated when I
asked the distinguished Senator !rom
New York to yield-in order to indicate
that a proposal coming from a quarter
with which we have had differences, but
with which we are still, on the whole,
friendly, should not be treated casually,
should not be tossed out the window;
but if such an idea has merit, it should
be given some consideration; and if,
after study, we find that it has no merit,
then it should be tossed aside.
Mr. JAVTI'S. Mr. President, no one
respects the majority leader more than
I do. I have said that many times, and
I am sure he knows that.
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I rose today only to make clear what
I think needs to be made clear even 1t
that does involve a difference with the
maJority leader.
What I thought needed to be made
clear waa that the struggle which we are
helping to wage in South Vietnam 1.1
understandable to the American people,
and that they are determined to wage
it, and that they will not stop waging it
until they see a much better solution
than De Gaulle's idea that he will "take
care of it", and just "leave it to him."
After all, he "took care of it" at Dien
Bien Phu, too.
Mr. MANSFIELD. No; he did not,
because he was not in power at the time.
Mr. JAVITS. I am speaking about
France.
Mr. MANSFIELD. But on the basts
of what the distinguished senator from
New York has said, I hope he will keep
ui mind the other two alternatives-because he is making a distinct contribution, and we have remained silent too
long on this subject.
It ls all very well for the people to talk
about Panama and Cyprus and the diffi.cultles there; but perhaps the most dimcult problem at the present time ls the
one in southeast Asia. On that basis
and on the basis of the intelUgence the
Senator from New York always displays,
I think his suggestions will be a servtcP.
to the country, which 1s dlspla.ylng great
interest in this most dlmcult and vexatious problem.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I am
most grateful to the majority leader.
I point out that the minute we begin
to talk about neutralization and neutralism, the backbone and the spirit could go
out of the action which 1s being taken
in this struggle. No one would intend
that or desire it to happen, but such
things do happen.
Therefore, I thought it important to
emphasiZe-and to speak these words in
the same forum-the determination of
the American people, as I view it, to
carry on the struggle in Vietnam until
there 1s a far more viable solution.
Mr. President, let us remember that
our forces are in South Korea, and have
been there for 14 years; that South
Korea has not been neutralized; but that,
nonetheless, the confrontation between
ourselves and the Communist Chinese in
South Korea has been a very restraining
influence upon the Communist Chinese,
and will continue to be for a very long
time to come.
Let us remember also in respect of
Communist China that her Incursion
against India, her deals with Pakistan,
the taking of Tibet, and her assaults,
which for the m om ent have ceased, on
Taiwan, certainly are not reassuring in
terms of the intentions of Communist
China, which I believe are very clear-to
dominate the whole of the Asian Continent.
With all due respect to the Senator
from Montana, I believe he assumes far
too much when h e assumes that the relations between Ho Chi Minh and Moscow
are better than the relations between Ho
Chi Minh and Mao Tse-tung. I believe
there are many proverbs, both Eastern

and Western, to the effect that the tiger
at the door is much more important than
the tiger in the forest.
It 1a inconceivable to me, and to most
Americans, that Ho Chi Minh could be
carrying on this guerrilla war throughout
South Vietnam and Cambodia and into
Laos without the friendship , support, and
alliance of the Communist Chinese, who
are on his doorstep, and without whom
he could not survive for 20 minutes.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. JAVITS. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. If the Senator
wlll go back over his history, he will
recall that the enmity between Vietnam,
and the Chinese to the north goes back
well over 1,000 years. Much of Vietnam,
and almost all of southeast Asia, were
either tributary to or vassal kingdoms
of the Chinese emperors.
There 1s an inherent fear on the part
of all Vietnamese because of the nearness
of China; and there is, I believe, testimony to the effect that even in recent
weeks there have been exchanges of
missions between Moscow and Hanoi
by means of which North VIetnamese
groups went to Moscow for the purpose
of seeking assistance from the Soviet
Union.
The Senator will recall that when the
activities in Laos were being carried on
by the Pathet Lao, it was not the Communist Chinese who were sending down
the supplies by sea from Vladivostok and
elsewhere on the Siberian coast, but it
was the Soviet Union which was sending
down those supplies to Haiphong, tbe
port for Hanoi, and from there sent
overland into Laos and were taken over
by the Pathet Lao.
There have been no indications, I admit, that in recent months there have
been any Soviet airlifts or Soviet sea
trips from Vladivostok or any other ports
to Hanoi. But I still think that basically
the friendship is toward Moscow, and
basically the enmity on the part of the
Vietnamese, North and South, is still
directed toward Pe!ping.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I would
not wish to be distracted from the main
scene by what Is a sideshow. We all
know that the Poles and the Finns hate
the Russians, too. Nevertheless, those
people do the bidding of the Russians
because they have no other choice. Be
that as it may, the end point Is as follows: If North Vietnam should be able
to overrun South Vietnam, and thus destroy the whole position in south and
southeast Asia, she would be doing an
inestimable service to Communist China.
That is all I am speaking about.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. JAVITS. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Who has indicated
that North Vietnam would seek to overrun South Vietnam? Who has brought
out any indication that General Giap,
an able soldier, has ever used his troops
on that basis to penetrate into North
Vietnam? It may be that elements of
the North Vietnamese Army have penetrated into South Vietnam. I do not
know.
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But south of Saigon, in the Meko~
Delta, there are a number of Communist VIetcong elements which do not
seem to be decreasing in number, and
which have been most effective In f1ght1ng the VIetnamese Army in that particular area. Of course, circumstancesgeography and terrain-are on their
side, as was the case in the Red River
Delta outside of Hanoi when the French
were in control and tried to subjugate
that area. They were unsuccessful.
The point is as follows: To the best
of my knowledge, only Irregular elements have been coming Into South VIetnam. Perhaps certain elements of the
North Vietnamese Army have also come
in. Again, I do not know for certain the
facts In this matter.
Mr. JAVITS. The Senator from New
York has certainly not charged that
which he knows nothing about as to the
regular elements of the North Vietnamese Army. But It 1s very clear-and
upon this point the Senator from New
York has received ample confirmationthat the lines of supply and the base
of support for what 1s going on in South
Vietnam are in North Vietnam.
When things really became hot, as
they did at one time in the northern
provinces, the Communist elements
moved over into North Vietman for rest,
reequipment, and supply. Without that
base, the whole operation of the Communists in South Vietnam would be untenable. We well know Communist
technique in these wars of so- called national liberation which are fought In
precisely that way. We also know that
if the Communists should take over in
South Vietnam, it would be as effective,
from the point of view of the free world,
in that there would be another Communist state which would play freely
with North Vietnam and Communist
China. That is the only point I am
making.
I do not desire to be diverted from
my main point. I believe the American
people support what 1s being done in
South Vietnam. I do not believe that
the American people are in any mood to
back away from it. If they are, they
should not be, because though we are
suffering casualties and running grave
risks, the alternatives are far more dire.
Let us remember that even a great nation must suffer casualties currently in
order to avoid even greater casualties
later. The-present position in south and
southeast Asia--representing still a
rampart against the absolutely uncontrolled expansion of Communist China,
which preaches to all its people that its
ultimate aim is the destruction not only
of the free world, but specifically the
United States of America and its people-it seems to me is only insurance
against a future which seems so foreboding in terms of the intentions at the
moment which Communist China declared and reiterated for so very long.
Mr. GROENING. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. JAVITS. Not yet. I shall yield
In a moment. My only purpose in speaking is that on the one hand we are told
that we should have a completely open
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mind about this area, that we should
consider President de Gaulle's suggestions--and I assume those of anyone
else-and also that we should be searchIng for new methods, new techniques,
and new ways of dealing with the problem. I believe It Is also Important to
reiterate our fortitude and determination to stay In South VIetnam and do
the job, though It is costly and difficult.
We should reiterate our determmation
to try to find a viable, freely elected government for South VIetnam, purswng
very much the same policy that we have
pursued, notwithstanding reverses. in
South Korea, and for the very same reasons. I merely reiterate that. I believe
It Is extremely important. I do not
think there should be any sapping or lessening of the morale of the Amencan
people, nor do I believe that the Pentagon should be doubtful of the fortitude
of the American people, or that there
must be a promise that we will not pull
out or they will not stick It out. That
was the mistake made after World War
n that was so costly to us In terms of the
rise of the Communist power In Europe.
It resulted In nothing but losses; and we
are still licking our wounds today. We
do not wish to repeat that experience In
southeast Asia.
It Is not necessary to have a repetition
of the debate about morale, as we did
with General MacArthur. It Is not necessary for a determination that we must
wipe out the northern base for this operation In South VIetnam. Sufficient
unto the day Is the work thereof.
All that must be reiterated now Is
that we know what we are doing. We
will continue to do it. It is worth doing.
No one in the Pentagon or in the Senate
need have the "jitters" about it. It Is
high time that some people understand
that the American people are adults.
They understand that in order to make
an omelet, some eggs must be broken.
Mr. QRUENINO. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. JAVITS. ?-1 ot yet. A little later.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. J AVITS. I should first like to
finish my thought.
Mr. MANSFIELV. The Senator has
used a word which I believe needs correction.
Mr. JAVITS. If the Senator would
permit me to finish, I should be glad to
withdraw the word "jitters."
Mr. MANSFIELD. Very well.
Mr. JAVITS. I wish to speak in the
amrmatlve. I love the majority- leader
too much to be critical. I mean that In
every way. I wish to speak only In the
amrmatlve. I think there must be cojoined with whatever he has said and
whatever Secretary McNamara has said
about the fact that we will bring people
back from Vietnam a reiteration of the
American determination to do what we
are doing, even though it involves losses,
to persist In doing what we are doing,
to undertake our commitment and to
carry It through, because It is worthwhile and because the alternatives are
great~r losses, both 1n national terms
and In terms of killed and wounded and
the expenditure of treasure.

That Is all that needs to be said about
It If we have both understandings,
certamly the United States should always keep an open mind. I am sure the
maJority leader, and others, as well as
I, am for our experts In the State Department and others using their lngenulty to see If they cannot come forward with a better line of policy. I
have heard people raise some questions,
but I think we are convinced that what
we are doing Is ne·c essary and that no
pullout Is necessary 111 order to placate
a feeling by some American people that
we are doing the wrong thing, On the
contrary, it 1s the right tlllng, and I
think we must contmue to do it Ill the
national interest and In the int.crest of
the American people
Mr. GRUENING Mr President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. JAVITS I yield
Mr. GRUENING. I understand the
Senator made a comparison of the
United States long soJoum of 14 years
1n South Korea with the situalion in
South Vietnam Has the Senator noted
the marked difference in the attitude of
the South Koreans from that of the
South Vietnamese? The South Koreans
were opposed to the Communists. They
fought bravely and incurred many losses.
The United States went in there to help
those who wanted to help themselves.
There seems to be a lack of will on the
part of the South Vietnamese to wage a
fight against the Communists. It contrasts with the will to fight of the
Koreans. That L~ the bas1s of our difficulty in VIetnam. The Vietnamese
show no great enthusiasm for being
saved. That is why our performance
there has not been as successful as it
should have been. wm the Senator comment on that point?
Mr. JAVITS. Yes. On the first
point, I would prefer not to say that the
South Vietnamese have not been willing
to fight . On occasion they have shown
a great intrepidity and have sustained
great losses, both civilian and military,
It seems to me the problem has been
one of government stability and the
question of whether the government
has had the interests of the people at
heart. which has been a blow to morale.
Nevertheless, I would not try to d1 aw a
precise comparison between the South
Koreans and the South VIetnamese.
I was only pointing out that we have
had mil1tary programs in a dangerous
spot for a long period of time, and, notwithstanding the dangers and losses, the
policy has paid off, because the Communist forces have been restrained 1n
that area of the world for a very considerable time. I was only making the
analogy that we cannot look at these
problems in terms of short swings, We
must take the longer swings Into consideration. That was the only comparIson I was making.
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield further?
Mr. JAVITS. I yield .
Mr. GRUENING. Does the Senator
think that if our action in South Vietnam
is not more successful than 1t appears to
have been, we should go in there with
greater strength. more manpower, and
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more equipment and v.1.n the war for the
South VIetnamese?
Mr. JAVITS. I think I have made my
v1ews on that pomt ve1-y clear-that we
ought to continue doing what we are
doing I am not sittmg 111 the Pentagon
and judging the strategiC and tactical
necess1t1es If I could write a one-line
directive, I think It would be that we
should do what we nrc doing. We should
continue w1th our "instruction" m that
area. and support it with highly t.cchmcal assistance, and also incur the
danger which is mvolved. which is a
help tD the morale of the Vietnamese,
and do our utmost to brmg about a freely
elected government there.
I cannot say to the Senator that I
would send in a new group of instructors.
or take out an old group, or increase the
nwnber from 15.500 to 16,500, or reduce
it U> 14.500. I do not know. That is
why I have said we ~hould continue to
do what we have been doing; that the
effort Is worthwhile, and that the American people are backing it up, or should
be; and that we should determine to
cojoin our ideas. as was done in the
debate engaged in yesterday, in looking
at De Gaulle's neutralist Ideas, and
thinking of other ways to deal with the
problems.
I had feared that unless our ideas
were cojoined, the result might be to lead
people to feel that the United States was
looking for a way out.
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield further?
Mr JAVITS. I yield
Mr. GRUENING. I agree with the
Scna.tor that there should be an open
mmd, but I do not think anyone can
state with any degree of assurance that
our policy and performance in Vietnam
to date have been successful. We have
been in there for a long time and we
have lost substantially, both in American
lives, and in southeast Asia over four
billion dollars in money. We are now
spending at the rate of a million dollars
a day. Will the Senator admit that if
this situation continues much further
Without success, we should have an alternative? Does the Senator think that
1f we continue In this way we should go
in!A> that area with larger forces and
sec if we can wm the war, instead of having a stalemate, which would go on and
on with loss of Amelican lives and substance?
Mr. JAVITS. As to the increase in
forces, I think I have answered that
point by saying I would contmue U> do
what we have been doing. At least we
have outlined an objective and have
learned what Is required to cany out
that objective.
W1th respect to the success or lack of
it, I certainly am no apologist for the
administration However, South Vietnam has not been taken over by the
Communists. If that took place, it
would be a disastrous rout for us. That
has not happened I do not want it to
happen
I would certainly rather have that
situation than the alternative. I am sure
that the Senator from Montana, as well
as I, and the rest of us, would want to
guard against it. That Is the purpose of
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my making this statement. When one
gives tongue to an Idea, one can interest
others in It, and perhaps arrive at a
consensus, just as we should look at all
problems with fairness, with open eyes,
and try to decide on our own. But that
is no "flap" for pulling out of Vietnam
because certain people have determined
that we should not pursue what we have
been doing. That is all I have been tryIng to say today.
Mr. GRUENING. I thank the Senator.
Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator,
and also the majority leader, for their
kind contributions.
Mr. PROUTY. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. JAVITS. I yield.
Mr. PROUTY. The Senator from New
York has rendered a. signal service to
the country by a logical analysis of the
situation in South Vietnam. What
really concerns the top mll1tary personnel in the Pentagon is the fact that
measures are not being taken which
would enable them to win the war with
Vietnam. I think that concerns our officials. I commend the Senator from
New York.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, w!ll
the Senator yield?
Mr. JAVITS. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. The discussion
which has taken place this afternoon
has broken a long s!lence on affairs in
Vietnam. The distinguished Senator
from New York has performed a service.
I know he agrees with me when I say
the answer is not an increase in forces
or resources, to carry the war into North
Vietnam or, for that matter, possibly
into Communist China Itself. I know he
agrees with me that the answer is not
a withdraw!\! of the American forces in
South Vietnam at the present time. But
if he agrees with me in those two respects, I believe we should keep an open
mind to consider other possib!lities.
Wh!le we may disagree with a man of
the stature of General de Gaulle from
time to time-and I do, most certainlynevertheless, I have a great respect for
him because I believe he is doing for his
country that which France, by and large,
wishes him to do. When he does these
things, he sometimes comes Into disagreement with his allies; but that is
his responsibility, just as what we do is
our responsib!l!ty.
The mere fact that he advanced the
Idea covering the old associated states
of French Indochina does not necessarily mean that our reaction should be
to treat it in a casual way or to pay no
attention to it.
I believe an open mind is a good thing.
I believe discussions concerning a most
dilllcult part of the world in which we
are heavily involved are worthwhile. I
believe that so far as Vietnam is concerned, it is just as important as Cuba,
even though one Is 10,000 miles away
and the other is only 90 miles from our
shores.
I point out that late news stories are
to the effect that no more dependents
would go to Guantanamo, and that those
who are there would be brought home
when their regular tours of duty were
over, If not before. Perhaps we have too
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many dependents in South Vietnam. presence in Berlin of the allies. At the
Perhaps a conftict of !Dterest exists be- time, the Russians could easily have
cause of th1s fact. But I point out, 1! my taken over Berlin and made of it the
understanding Is correct, that what we capital of East Germany. In any case,
have sent to South Vietnam are probably the decision could have gone either way,
the best we have In the way of fighting in my judgment, but I believe that our
men, that they are the elite of the varl- debate upon the subject or consideration
ous services, and that they all volun- of the subject Is helpful to the country,
teered for that hazardous duty. But as I hope this one wUl be.
there Is no reason why discussion should
Mr. MANSFIELD. Speaking of Be rnot occur. There Is no reason why de- lin, this Is one area in the world where
bate and differences on the floor of the the U .S . Government is !D effect begging
Senate should not be stated because ways the Soviet authorities and the Soviet
and means will have to be found not only troops to r emain, because we do not wish
in South Vietnam, but elsewhere to displace them by East Germans.
throughout the world, to face the changes
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, that Is
which occur and to try to do our best a subject which I shall be glad to disas the leader of the free world, as the cuss at some other time ; but right now
Nation charged with the primary respon- I believe we had better keep our eyes
s!b!l!ty, in my opinion, in too many areas fastened on the Vietnamese ball, which
of the world, to find different answers is serious enough.
and to face different changes In different
Mr. MANSFIELD. It is always a
times.
pleasure and a privilege to have the opMr. JAVITS. As to my answers in portunity to debate and diacuss !s.sues,
agreement or disagreement with respect both foreign and domestic, with the disto the basic posture of the Senator from tinguished Senator from New York.
Montana, I have already expressed my
Mr. JAVITS. I am grateful to the
views in my address, and I shall let those Senator for those remarks. I am pleased
answers stand as answers to those ques- at his reference to me. He knows full
tions.
well that I deeply feel the same way
As to General de Gaulle, I too, have about him.
great respect for him. He was a great
hero during the war. He is a great hero
to his people. I deeply believe, however,
that General de Gaulle could not be
doing what he is doing for France unless
we were around to do what we are doing
for the free world, and that so long as
this is a rather free ride, we had better
be wary of how we operate in taking
these grand suggestions.
That Is the only thing I stressed In
my speech-that we had better not be
distracted from persevering in the basic
policy in relation' to the free world, and
that our people, in my judgment, should
support it.
That was the reason for my speaking
today. I agree with the Senator from
Montana that the airing of this issue is
valuable.
I believe that he and I made somewhat
similar speeches In regard to Berlin.
The Senator from Montana flr:;t authored the suggestion with respect to
some possible change or consideration of
a change In the status of Berlin. He
took up the issue in much the same way
I am doing today, In order, if possible,
to reach a consensus. I believe the
Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Doool
participated in this debate, along with
many other Senators. The result was a
better consciousness in the United States
of its policy and determination as to how
to pursue it to the best effect.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, wlll
the Senator from New York yield at that
point?
Mr. JAVITS. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. There was a
change which resulted In the wall being
created between East and West Berlin,
instead of a unified Berlin, a Berlin to
be the future capital of a unified Germany.
Mr. JAVITS. I do not wish to raise
that problem again, but it was my view
that the r~t might have been extremely dangerous to the continued

